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A.u:XANDER v. STATE PERSONNEL BD. 198 [22 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 18401. In Bank. May 10, 1943.1 
ARTHUR H. ALEXANDER et aI., Appellants, v.STATE 
PE~SONNEL BOARD OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Adn;tinist~ative Law-.Tudieial RemedieB-'--Exhaustion of Ad~ 
minlStratlveRemedies.-Adtninistrative remedies must be ex-
h.austed before one aggrieved by the rulings of an ad~inistra-
tIve body may seek redress' in the· courts. . 
[2] ~ivn Service - Reinstatement-RemedieB-'--Prerequisites---Pe_ 
t~tion for ~e.hearillg.-Apetitionfor a writ of mandate' tore-
Vle~. a declSlonOf the~ State Personnel Board discharging the 
petitIOners fro~ ~ervice and for an, order (if reinstatement 
wa.s p~operlydlslIl~ssed, wh~re. a petition for rehearing before 
t~e. board ~ was not filed wIthm the time prescribed' by the 
CIvil SerVICe Act, § 173 (c) (Deering's Gen Laws' 1937 Act 1404). . , ,. 
APPEAL from a jlldgm~nt of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Emmet H. Wilson, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Pro(leeding in ma~dllmus to reinstate state (livil service 
emp~oy:es and to r~qU1re paym~n~ of back salaries. Judgment 
of dIsmIssal ~O~OWlI~g the s'llstammg of a demurrer to a fourth 
amend.ed petItIon WIthout leave to amend, affirmed. 
Holbrook & Tarr, W. Sumner Holbrook Jr. and L R 
Tarr for Petitioners. ". . 
Earl Warren, Aitorney General,and Bayard Rhone, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Respondents. 
~ .... -.~'-"'" .---:~. ~. ---
S:S;E.NK, J.-Appeal from a judgment entered on an order 
sus~a.mmg . the respondents·' demurrer to the fourth amended 
petItIOn WIthout . leave to amend. 
The pet.itio:qers,AJexander and Sturzenacker, applied to 
the SuperIor Courtm Los Angeles County for the writ of 
[2] See 3 Oal.Ju:f. Ten-year SuPp. (PocketPal't) Ci '1 S . 
§ 11; 10 Am.Jur. 930. . ' , VI erVICe, 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Administrative Law' [2] C' il S 
ice, § 14. ' IV erv-
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mandate directing the State Personnel Board and, the State 
Land Commission to reinstate them respectively as Petrole'1,llll 
Production Inspector for the Division of State Lands, and 
Chief of the Division of State Lands, Department of Finance, 
from· which it was alleged they were wrongfUlly distti:issed~,' 
and to pay to them back salary from the date of suspension~ 
Complaints charging the petitioners with incompetency and 
misconduct were filed with the State Personnel Board on 
July 12, 1938. Suspension occurred on' August 23, 19~8. 
Heat:ings were commenced on September 26, 1938. A copy of 
the board's findings, conclusions' and decision' dismissing the 
petitioners was mailed to their counsel on April 8, 1939, and 
was received two days later. The decision was entered on the' 
roster of state employees on April 11, 1939, and in the min-
utes of the board on April 21. Thepetition for the writof 
mandate was filed on July 5, 1939. On September 11, 1939, 
the petitioners filed with the board a petition for rehearing 
which was denied. 
The petitioners allege that the conduct· of the proceedings 
was irregular; that the members of the board were dis-
qualified by bias, and that by certain utterances one member 
had prejudged the petitioners' causes. 
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the sole ground 
that the petitioners could not state a cause for relief because 
application for rehearing by the board had not been made 
withmthe. time prescribed by the State Civil Service Act 
and prior to the filing of the petition for relief in the courts. 
Section 173(c) of the Civil Service Act (Stats. 1937, 
p. 2085; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, Act 1404) provides that 
within thirty days from and after receipt by him of a. copy 
of the board's decision, the employee or the appointing power 
may apply for a rehearing. 
The time within which the petitioners could have applied 
for a rehearing expired before the petition for the writ of 
mandate was filed in the superior court, and the belated ap-
plication for a rehearing made in September following was 
ineffective. The petition for the writ of mandate was other-
wise filed within the time prescribed by the Civil Service Act. 
[1] The rule that administrative remedies must be ex-
hausted before redress may be had in the courts is established 
in this state. (Abelleira v. District Oourt of Appeal" 17 Cal. 
2d 280 [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R 715], and cases cited at 
, , , 200 ALEXANDERV. STATE PERSONNEL Bo. [22 C.2d 
pages 292, 293, 302.) The provision for a rehearing is U1..-
questionably such a remedy. As to the general rule, it is 
stated in Vandalia Railroad 00. v. Public Service Oommis-
sion of Indiana, 242 U.S. 255 [37 S.Ct. 93, 61 L.Ed. 276], 
at page 261, that one aggrieved by the rulings of an adminis.., 
trative board may not complain that he has been deprived 
1)£ constitutional rights if he has not availed himself of the 
remedies prescribed for a rectification of such rulings. 
[2] The petitioners ask this court to distingu :.sh between 
a provision in a statute which requires the filing of a peti-
tion. for rehearing before an administrative' board as a condi. 
tion precedent to commencing proceedings in the courts, (see 
Oarlson v. Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 653 [15 P.2d 859]; 
Albin v. Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 655 [15 P.2d 860] ; 
Palermo Land &- Water 00. v. Railroad Oommission of Oali-
fornia, 227 F. 708), and a provision such as in the present 
act which it is claimed is permissive only. The distinction 
is of no assistance to the petitioners under the rule. If a 
rehearing is available it is an administrative remedy to which 
the petitioners must first resort in order to give the board 
an opportunity to correct any mistakes it may have made. 
As noted in the Abelleira case, supra, at page 293, the rule must 
be enforced uniformly by the courts. Its enforcement is not a 
matter of judicial discretion. It is true, the CivIl Service 
Act does not expressly require that application for a rehear-
ingbe made asa condition precedent to redress in the courts. 
~ut neither does the act expressly designate a specific remedy 
,In the courts. So that where, as here, the act provides for a 
rehearing, but makes no provision for specific redress in the 
courts and resort to rehearing as a condition precedent, the 
rule of exhaustion of administrative remedIes supplies the 
omission. The facts here alleged do not bring the case within 
any possible exception to the enforcement of· the rule. Ad-
h<lrence to the rule is not excused in this case because of the 
bare ~robability,. ass.erted long after the time had expired, 
that tImely applIcatIon for rehearing would have been de-
nied. As suggeSted in Red River Broadcasting 00. v. Federal 
Oommunications Oom., 98 F.2d 282, the petitioners cannot be 
heard to urge that there was danger of refusal of their appli-
cation when they did not make the effort within the time pre-
scribed. 
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined that 
the petitioners were not entitled to prosecute the present pro-
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ceeding because they had not first exhausted. the available 
remedies before the State Personnel Board. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J. pro t~m., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., did not participate herein. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent; The majority op,inion e:rlends.the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. far beyond 
my conception of what the rule should be in view of the lack 
of uniformity in the rules of procedure applicable to the' va~ 
rious adniinistrative agencies established under. the law of 
this state. It seems to me more consonant with .principles 
applicable to procedure before judicial and quasi-judicial 
tribunals that unless application for a' reheapn'g is made 
mandatory by statute or rule, such application need not be 
made as a condition precedent to a review of the, decision or 
order of such tribunal. Such is the rule with respect to 
proceedings before judicial tribunals. That is, it :is not now 
necessary to make a motion for a new trial in a trial court 
before prosecuting an appeal· froil'ia judgment of that court; 
neither is it necessary to petition. a District Court of Appeal 
for a rehearing before petitioning the Supreme Court for a' 
hearing after decision rendered' by such District Court of 
Appeal. , 
The Legislature has by 'express statutory provision m~d~ 
mandatory a petition for rehearing before a party dissatisfied 
with the decision of the Railroad Commission (secs.66-67, 
Act .6386 Gen. Laws) or InduStrial Accident Commission 
(secs. 5900-5910, Labor Code) may petition the Suprem~ 
Court for a review of the decision ()feither of said eom:triis·, 
sions. If it were the law that a petition for rehearing were' 
indispensable before such review coUld be had, the mandatory: 
statutory. provisions applicable to the Railroad. Commission: 
and Industrial Accident Commission are mere surplusage. . 
The provision of the State Civil Service Act construed ili" 
the majority opinion is subdivision (c) of section 173 and 
reads as follows: ' . . . 
" (c) Rehearing. Within thirty dayS from and after re~ 
ceipt by him of a copy of the deCIsion rendered by the board) 
in a proceeding under this section, the employee or the fl.P~: 





202 'ALEXANDER V. STATE PERSONNEL BD. [22 C.2d 
pointing power may apply for a rehearing by filing with the 
board a petition in writing therefor. Within thirty days 
after such filing the board shall cause notice thereof to be 
served upon the other parties to the proceedings by mailing to 
each a copy of the petition for rehearing, in the same man-
ner as in this act prescribed for the giving of notice of a 
hearing. Within sixty days after the service' of such notice 
of the filing of the petition for rehearing, the board shall 
either grant or deny the petition, and if the petition for 
rehearing is not granted within said period, it shall be 
deemed denied. If the petition for a rehearing' is granted, 
the matter shall be set down for heal'ingby the board, either 
b'efore the board or before its authorized representative, and 
such' hearing shall be conducted in substantially the same 
manner and under like rules "Of procedure as an original 
hearing upon charges filed under and pursuant to the pro-
visions of this section." (Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the statute uses the permissive 
, "may" instead of the mandatory "shall" or "must" in pro-
viding that either the employee or the appointing power may 
petition for a rehearing. It is true that the Civil Service Act 
does not provide for a judicial review of the decisions of the 
Personnel Board, but section 52 of the act creates a statute 
of limitation on actions or proceedings brought to obtain' a 
"legal remedy for wrongs or grievances based on or related 
to any civil service law in this State or the administration 
thereof. " This section provides that no person seeking a 
legal remedy under this act shall be compensated for the 
time subsequent to the date when his action or proceeding 
arose unless such action or proceeding is filed and served 
'within ninety days after the same arose. 
In the case at bar petitioners were suspended from their 
civil service positions by the State Land Commission, the 
employing body, on August 2, 1938, pending the hearing on 
the charges against them before the Personnel Board. The 
decision of the Personnel Board finding the petitioners guilty 
of the charges was not mailed to petitioners' counsel until 
April 8, 1939. The present action was filed in the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County on July 15, 1939. Conceding 
that petitioners could not have commenced their action to 
obtain a legal remedy for redress of their alleged wrong or 
grievance until after receiving notice of the decision of the 
Personnel Board, it appears from a reading of the provision 
May 1943J ALEXANDER v. STATE PERSONNEL BD. 
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above quoted pertaining to rehearings that had ~ey bee~ 
required to petition for a rehearing beforecommenclllg theIr 
action it would have been possible for at least 120 days to, 
elapse from the date of the decision of, the Pers?nnel Boa~d 
before such action could be commenced. ObVl?usly; th~lr 
cause of action arose when the Personnel Board rendered Its 
decision sustaining the charges against them, a:nd' had; they 
filed a petition for a rehearing and been required to walt 120 
days before commencing their action,' it is probable, that they' 
would now be met with the contention that their action ~as 
commenced too late to enable them to recover compensatIon 
for the time subsequent to the date when their caus~ of, action 
arose. . . .. t"h t 
The obvious purpose of the LegIslature III reqUIrIng a 
an action be commenced within ninety days after the cause 
of action arose to permit the employee to recover compen-
sation for the time subsequent thereto, was to prevent the ac-
cumulation of large salary claims for employees who had been 
illegally suspended or separated from the~r emplo~ent, II;lld 
to my mind it is highly improbable that It was the lllte~t~on 
of the Legislature to' require the employee ~o file, a ~etltlOn 
for lit rehearing with the prospects of not belllg pe~lt.ted to 
commence his action within 120 days after the deCISIon of 
the Personnel Board. Such interpretation of the statute is 
to my mind unreasonable and contrary to recognized rul~ 
of statutory construction. I -could not better state my attI-
tude toward the present statute as applied to this case than 
in the language of the pre.sent Chief Justice of the United 
States in United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 357 [46 KCt. 
513 70 L.Ed. 986], where he said: . 
',ZAll laws are to be given a sensible construction; and a 
literal application of a statute, which would lead to absurd 
consequences should be avoided ~henever. a reasona?le ~p­
plication can be given to it, consIstent WIth the legIslatIve 
purpose. ", ' ., . 
For the foregoing reasons I am convmced that petItIoners 
were not required to petition for a rehearing before the Per-
sonnel Board before commencing their action in the superior 
-court to obtain a review of the decision of said board. and 
therefore the judgment of dismissal entered on the order of 
the trial court sustaining a demurrer to their petition with-
out leave to amend on this ground should be reversed. 
.' , 
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TRAYNOR, J.-l dissent. The majority opinion holds 
that' applications for administrative rehearings permitted by 
statute but not expressly required as a condition precedent" 
to redress in the courts, are in effect required by' the rule 
calling for exhaustion of administrative remedies. At the 
same time it acknowledges the possibility of exceptions where 
a rehearing would not constitute an adequate remedy, thus 
introducing a perennial question for litigation, and judicial 
determination. Determinations might prove necessary not 
only for each administrative body,in the state but for each 
new question that arose before it. 
Such litigation could be avoided by an unequivocal rule 
that applications for reheari:J;lg permitted by statute are in-
variably compulsory before resort to the courts. So inflexi-
ble a rule, however, would take no account of the endless 
'variations in the administrative bodies throughout, tht'l.state. 
They vary in accessibility, formality of procedure, regularity 
of meetings, personnel, volume of work, the making and keep-
ing of records, and dispatch of business. Situations cOn-
stantly arise where one or more of these factors would make 
it impossible for an administrative rehearing to be an ade-
quate remedy. To demand compliance with an administra-
tive, determination pending such a hearing might work great 
hardship, as in the case of suspension of licenses. On the 
other hand, to postpone compliance until the decision follow-
ing rehearing might work great harm, as in the case of the 
continuation of practices inimical to public health and morals. 
It is my opinion that there is greater wisdom in the rule 
that applications for administrative rehearings are not pre-
requisite to judicial remedies unless so prescribed by statute. 
(Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 48 
[43 S.Ct. 466, 67 L.Ed.853] ; Banton v. Belt Line Ry. Corp., 
268 U;S. 413, 416 [45 S.Ct. 584; 69 L.Ed. 1020]; United 
States v. Abilene & So. By. Co., 265 U.S. 274, 282 [44 S.Ct. 
565,68 L.Ed. 1016] ; Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. Blease, 
~2 F.2d 463, 465; Pender Oountyv. Garysburg Mfg. 00.,50 
F,2d 732; Canadian River Gas Co. v. Terrell, 4 F.Supp. 222; 
see Birch' v. Oounty of Orange, 186 Cal. 736, 742-745 [200 
P. 647].) Under such a rule the Legislature, to which the 
task appropriately falls, would select the administrative bodies 
whose functions and procedure insure the fitness of a require-
ment that applications for rehearing precede resort to the 
courts. In this wise it has already selected the Railroad Com: 
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mission (Public Utilities Act, sec. 66) and the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission (Labor Code, sec;,' 590i). (Cartson v. 
Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 653 [15 P.2d 8.59); Albin V~ 
Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal., 655J15 P.2d860];.Palmero 
Land & Water 00. v. Railroad Oommission of California, 227 
F. 708.) There.is nothing in Abelleira v.Districf Oourt'of 
Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d280[109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R.7151; that 
would preclude the adoption of such a rule., That case was, 
concerned, not with the rehearing qu~!!tioIl, but, with theap~ 
plica.tion of the general rule of exhaustion of. remedies to the 
prosecution of an appeal to a commissiorifroIp an adjust-
mentunit.thereof. The casesapply~g the exhailStionofrem-
edies rule "where, the administrative procedure prescribes a 
rehearing" (p. 302) were invoked merely t() pispOse of'the 
contention that the rule should not apply on the ground that 
the commission's earlier decisions in similar' cases would 
render appeal futile. 
[L. A. No. 18244. In Bank. May 17, 1943.] 
MAUD H. HUNSTOCK, Individulil1y and as Trustee, etc., 
Respondent" v. ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATION (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Process - Service-Mode-Delivery.-::-The wordll''by deliver-
ing;" a,s used in Code Civ. Proc., § 411, relating to service of 
process on corporations, require personal service upon the 
designated persons. 
[2] Id.--,Servic~Private Corporation~Delivery, to, Agent, or 
Secretary of State.-Inasmuch as the, word "deliver,f' in Civ. 
Code, § ,373, mell,ns delivery by hand when used in:.;eferring to 
semce on an officer or' agent of a dom,estic corp(!ratioD, such 
word Ill,ust be given the same meariingwhen uS,ed in another 
portion of the same statute in referring to serv~ce, on the Secre" 
tary, of State in lieu of service on the corporation., Moreover" 
in providing that service uppn the Secretary of State, may he 
made by delivery of the process Dot only to hUn but, also "to 
[1] See 21 Ca1.Jur. 492; 42 Am.Jur. 38. 
[2] ,See 6A Ca1.Jur. 1382; 42 Am.Jur. 92. 
McK. Dig. References: [15] Process; § 24;'[2-5,7; 8] Process, 
§ 56; [6] Administrative Law. ' ., 
'. 
